Competency and Common Law: Why and How Decision-Making Capacity Criteria Should Be Drawn from the Capacity-Determination Process by Baron, Charles H.
Boston College Law School
Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School
Boston College Law School Faculty Papers
1-1-2000
Competency and Common Law: Why and How
Decision-Making Capacity Criteria Should Be
Drawn from the Capacity-Determination Process
Charles H. Baron
Boston College Law School, charles.baron@bc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/lsfp
Part of the Elder Law Commons, Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons, Food and
Drug Law Commons, Health Law Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, and the Law and
Society Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Boston
College Law School Faculty Papers by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please
contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Charles H. Baron. "Competency and Common Law: Why and How Decision-Making Capacity Criteria Should Be Drawn from the
Capacity-Determination Process." Psychology, Public Policy and Law 6, (2000): 373-381.
Psychology, Public Policy, and Law Copyright 2000 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.
2000, Vol. 6, No. 2, 373-381 1076-8971/00/$5.00 DOI: 10.1037//1076-8971.6.2.373
COMPETENCY AND COMMON LAW
Why and How Decision-Making Capacity Criteria Should
Be Drawn From the Capacity-Determination Process
Charles H. Baron
Boston College Law School
Determining competence to request physician-assisted suicide should be no more
difficult than determining competence to refuse life-prolonging treatment. In both
cases, criteria and procedures should be developed out of the process of actually
making capacity determinations; they should not be promulgated a priori. Because
patient demeanor plays a critical role in capacity determinations, it should be made
part of the record of such determinations through greater use of video- and
audiotapes.
As a lawyer trained in the case method and sold on the virtues of common law
development, I would have preferred to see guidelines presented that had been
drawn out of actual cases and used in those cases to solve actual problems.
The Oregon Death with Dignity Act has been in operation for more than a
year. Preliminary data suggest that neither assessment of patient capability to
request physician aid in dying nor detection of impaired patient judgment has
presented serious obstacles to safe and effective implementation of the Act. The
published report of the Oregon Health Division1 states that, during the first year
of operation, 16 Oregon physicians provided 23 Oregon patients with prescrip-
tions for aid in dying under the Act. Only four of these cases involved a referral
to a psychiatrist or psychologist for determination as to whether the patient
suffered "impairment of judgment." Because the requested medication was ulti-
mately prescribed for the patients in all 23 cases, we can conclude that (a) in each
of the four cases where there was a referral, the consulting psychiatrist or
psychologist determined that there was no impairment of judgment; (b) in the
other 19 cases, the attending physician and the consulting physician concluded
that there was not enough evidence of impairment of judgment to justify such a
referral; and (c) in all of the 23 cases, the attending physician and the consulting
physician concluded that the patient was not incapable of requesting assisted
death under the terms of the Act. Of course, these statistics tell us only that the
professionals involved believed themselves able to make the clinical decisions
called for by the Act. They do not tell us that the decisions were made correctly.
But the fact that there has been so little criticism of the Act's implementation
during its first year suggests that there is a widespread view that the decisions
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Charles H. Baron, Boston
College Law School, 885 Centre Street, Newton, Massachusetts 02459. Electronic mail may be sent
to baron@bc.edu.
'Arthur E. Chin, Katrina Hedberg, Grant K. Higginson, and David W. Fleming. (1999).
Legalized physician-assisted suicide in Oregon—The first year's experience. New England Journal
of Medicine, 340, 577-583.
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have been appropriate. In light of the intense scrutiny to which the Act has been
subjected by its many critics—much of it focused on the problems of screening
for mentally incompetent patients—one would expect any failure of implemen-
tation to have been uncovered and publicly criticized. Instead, critics have been
heard to reluctantly praise the Act's implementation during the first year. Typical
is the comment of one priest-ethicist, who said "We'd rather people didn't choose
[physician-assisted death], but [the Act] challenges us to provide better care so
they won't choose it. ... [And the Act is] being implemented thoughtfully and
carefully."2
I would suggest that the starting point for developing guidelines should be a
study of the challenges that Oregon physicians and mental health professionals
have actually faced and the methods they have used for handling them with such
apparent success. They should be asked what sort of advice their experience
would lead them to give to others who may be asked to help patients under the Act
and what sort of guidelines they would like to see developed that might help
physicians and mental health professionals in the future. At the moment, it is hard
to know to what extent problems do, in fact, arise. Only four referrals were made
to mental health professionals, and there is reason to believe that at least some of
these (perhaps all) were made by physicians who believe that referrals should be
made in every case as a matter of course.3 On the other hand, we do not know how
many (if any) patients were turned away by physicians on the ground that they
were judged to be incapable to make a request for aid in dying. And we do not
know what methodology was used for determining whether a patient presented a
question of incapability to make a request or impairment of judgment and what
methodology was used for determining the answer to the question once it was
raised. Unfortunately, the Oregon Health Division was provided with neither the
staff nor the funding to conduct a study that could provide us with such infor-
mation.4 Funding and staffing should be provided to the Oregon Health Division
to provide that information in the future or some other research body should take
on the job of developing and publishing these very important data.
Of course, much relevant data can and should be obtained from other sources
as well. For decades, physicians and mental health professionals have been
making decisions regarding the mental competence of patients who request
cessation of life-prolonging treatment. There is no reason to think that the criteria
2See, Michael Vitez, Oregon Assisted Suicide Law Little-Used but Well-Regarded: Patients
Like Knowing They Have an Option, Philadelphia Inquirer, January 19, 1999, at 1:
Even those who opposed [the Act] grant the law a measure of respect.
"It's not the harbinger of destruction that people thought it was going to be, but it's still bad
social policy," said the Rev. John F. Tuohey, a Catholic priest who oversees health care ethics
at Providence Health System, the state's Catholic hospital network. "We'd rather people
didn't choose it, but it challenges us to provide better care so they won't choose it. ... It's
being implemented thoughtfully and carefully."
Another early opponent, the head of the Oregon Hospice Association, now says the Death
with Dignity Act is "working well."
'Telephone conversation between Charles Baron and Katrina Hedberg, M.D., Medical Epide-
miologist, Oregon Health Division on February 22, 1999.
4Id.
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or methodology for determining competence in those cases should be different
from the criteria or methodology to be used in cases under the Oregon Act.
Presumably any patient who is competent to request assistance in dying through
having life support removed is competent to request assistance in dying through
ingesting a drug. What reason is there to think that a person who can competently
process the issues involved in the former request cannot process those involved in
the latter? Over the last 20 years, probably thousands of health care professionals
have made decisions that thousands of patients were competent (or not) to request
aid in dying by way of withholding or withdrawing life support. Alas, we seem to
know next to nothing about the criteria and methodologies that have been used in
making those decisions. Here again, it is necessary that research be conducted so
that these data are developed and made available to serve as a solid, experiential
basis for the development of guidelines for such decisionmaking in the future.
Although the authors of the Proposed Guidelines recognize that the law
requires every patient to be presumed competent, promulgation of a set of a priori
guidelines through which patients must maneuver in every case may have the
practical effect of placing on patients a heavy burden of proving that they are
competent to request aid in dying. Using such guidelines, it may be too easy to
lose sight of the fact that challenges to mental competency raise fundamental
issues of human freedom. At base, the question of whether someone is to be
allowed to make a decision for him or herself is not a medical or psychological
question, it is a philosophical, political, and legal question. In many circum-
stances, medical and psychological data may seem almost entirely irrelevant.
Were we to use a comprehensive set of medico-psychological guidelines like the
one proposed to determine whether a person was competent to marry, we might
well judge that no one was truly competent to do so. Yet we allow not only
teenagers to wed, we allow the mentally retarded to do so. The history of our
country is replete with instances where its people have fought hard to establish the
principle that they are free to make decisions for themselves—no matter how
"poorly processed" others may think those decisions to be. Liberal philosophers,
such as Locke5 and Hume,6 have differed over whether that principle extends to
a decision to commit suicide. The Supreme Court of the United States has decided
that the United States Constitution does not require recognition of a general right
to physician-assisted suicide,7 but the people of the State of Oregon have enacted
the Oregon Death with Dignity Act in order to make that right available to
themselves. We should not superimpose on that Act a set of complicated psychi-
atric or psychological tests one must pass before being recognized as free to make
a decision for oneself.
The Oregon Act explicitly makes its provisions available unless a patient is
shown to be "incapable." The definitions section of the Act defines "incapable,"
rather than "capable." This negative approach to legal definition seems intended
to express the commitment of the Act's framers to the strong normal presumption
5See, John Locke, THE SECOND TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT, Chap. 2, §§ 4,6; Chap. 4, §§ 22-23.
6See, David Hume, ESSAYS ON SUICIDE AND THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL (1783).
Washington v. Glucksberg, 527 U.S. 702 (1997).
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of mental competency.8 Patients are to be presumed competent to request physi-
cian aid in dying unless something about their behavior raises a red flag. Perhaps
the patient shows an inability to remember facts that are important to the decision
or is clearly delusional about such facts. Perhaps the patient makes no sense when
trying to communicate reasons for requesting physician-assisted death. Perhaps
the patient seems only to parrot statements made by caretakers who appear to
exercise a great degree of control over the patient. In my limited experience in
representing patients in competency proceedings, it has been such obvious de-
meanor evidence that has caused the competency of patients to be challenged.
And it has been the demeanor of my client on the witness stand—not test results
or expert testimony—that has been the crucial factor in the judge's determination
of whether my client was incompetent. I suspect, but do not know, that others who
have been involved in such cases—physicians, mental health professionals,
judges, and attorneys—have had similar experiences. In developing guidelines, I
think it would be valuable to find out.
The idea of building guidelines "from the bottom up"—out of the experiences
of practitioners of a given art—is at the heart of the process of common law
development. Lord Edward Coke, the 17th-century English judge and scholar who
is in many ways the American legal community's unacknowledged role model,
once said of the common law:
[I]f all the reason that is dispersed into so many several heads, were united into
one, yet could he not make such a law as the law in England is; because by many
succession of ages it had been fined and refined by an infinite number of grave and
learned men, and by long experience grown to such perfection, for the government
of this realm, as the old rule may be verified of it, Neminem oportet esse
sapientiorum legibus: No man out of his own private reason ought to be wiser than
the law, which is the perfection of reason.9
As has recently been pointed out,10 similar views were held by contemporary high
practitioners of other arts. Abraham Fraunce, a rhetorician, had observed in 1588:
Logic is an art, to distinguish artificial logic from natural reason. Artificial logic is
gathered out of diverse examples of natural reason, which is not any art of logic,
but that ingraven gift and faculty of wit and reason shining in the particular
discourses of several men, whereby they both invent and orderly dispose.... This
as it is to no man given in full perfection, so diverse have it in sundry measure....
And then is the logic of art more certain than that of nature, because of many
8Indeed, legislators who have recently proposed amendments for the purpose of vitiating the
Act's impact have suggested language defining "capable" in place of "incapable" for just this reason.
See 70th Oregon Legislative Assembly (1999 Regular Session) Senate Bill 491, Section 1: "The
following words and phrases . . . shall have the following meanings: . . . (3) 'Capable' means that in
the opinion of a court or in the opinion of the patient's attending physician, psychiatrist or
psychologist, a patient has the ability to make and communicate health care decisions to health care
providers, including communication through persons familiar with the patient's manner of commu-
nicating if those persons are available."
9Sir Edward Coke, COMMENTARY UPON LITTLETON 97b (Charles Butler Ed., 18th ed., Legal
Classics Library 1985) (1628).
10See, Boyer, Allen Dillard, "Understanding Authority and Will": Sir Edward Coke and The
Elizabethan Origins of Judicial Review, 39 B.C. L. Rev. 43 (1997).
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particulars in nature, a general and infallible constitution of logic is put down in
art.11
The key to the never-ending process of "fining and refining" principles of logic or
of law was to promote constant dialogue among the practitioners of the art in
question. This dialogue was to be based on the practitioners' use of techniques in
actual cases to achieve successful results.
Coke saw the determination of the individual case and the application of the legal
principle as different functions linked by an equal s ign. . . . The law can be
rightfully followed and applied only where the true facts of the case are fully
understood. Coke repeatedly emphasizes the circumstances upon which the judge
acts, tying decisions to the facts.12
As the authors of the Proposed Guidelines point out, today's common law
courts have thus far failed us as regards development of meaningful standards for
determining incompetence. It is the rare judicial opinion that offers truly helpful
information as to how criteria for determining incompetence have been applied to
the facts of a case so as to produce the result reached by the court. There are even
fewer instances of courts engaging in dialogue with each other in an effort to
refine such criteria. Perhaps this is because there are relatively few cases in which
the competence of patients is challenged in court. In my opinion, it is more likely
to be a result of the fact that judges have found it difficult to explain in written
opinions precisely what facts have led them to their conclusions. If, as I suggest
above, the court's gestalt assessment of demeanor evidence is what is determi-
native in most of these cases, then the critical evidence in such cases will not be
captured in a written record. What may be needed is greater use of nonwritten
records, that is, audio- and videotape recordings. In the recent impeachment trial
of President Clinton, we have shared as a nation the experience of seeing the
extent to which videotaped depositions are capable of capturing critical demeanor
evidence that is lost in a written transcript. Audiotaping or videotaping of
testimony of patients could similarly offer the prospect of capturing critical
demeanor evidence in incompetency proceedings.
Audio- or videotaping to capture the demeanor of a patient also recommends
itself, in my opinion, as a means for protecting physicians and mental health
professionals from later claims that a patient should have been found incompetent
to request aid in dying. The "Model State Act to Authorize and Regulate
Physician-Assisted Suicide," of which I am a coauthor suggests audiotape and
videotape as the preferred means for documenting the required discussions with
a patient who requests assistance.13 In all of the controversy stirred up by the
recent airing on "60 Minutes" of Jack Kevorkian's assisted death of ALS patient
Thomas Youk, criticism of the process on the ground that Mr. Youk did not
competently request assistance was forestalled by the fact that videotape enabled
11
 Abraham Fraunce, THE LAWIERS LOOIKE, EXEMPLIFYING THE PRAECEPTS OF LOGIKE BY THE
PRACTISE OF THE COMMON LA WE B.ii (1588).
12Op cit. n. 10, at 61.
13Baron, Charles H., Bergstresser, Clyde, Brock, Daniel et al., A Model State Act to Authorize
and Regulate Physician-Assisted Suicide, 33 Harv. J. on Legis. 1, 29 (1996).
378 BARON
the public to judge for itself whether his demeanor was that of a man likely to be
incompetent to make the decision for himself. Protection of physicians and mental
health professionals from later claims of malpractice is stated by the authors of the
Proposed Guidelines to be one of their goals—perhaps, in the end, their main
goal—in promulgating the guidelines. Having concluded that "[m]aterial in the
mental health and medical literature is more useful for the psychiatrist or psy-
chologist . .. than the legal literature," (p. 359)14 they suggest that mental health
professionals operating under the Act should be guided by what the literature and
expert witnesses would establish as the standard of practice in a malpractice
action if one were later brought against them. They recommend the Proposed
Guidelines by saying:
If the course of action described below is adopted as appropriate, then the mental
health boards, physicians, significant others, prosecutors, expert witnesses, and
judges could use these guidelines to determine whether the consulting psychologist
or psychiatrist had performed a reasonably prudent evaluation. Consultants whose
evaluations were deemed to have fallen below this standard would be at risk
of ethical and legal reprisal; professionals who meet or exceed the guidelines
would be immune from censure: (p. 362)15
But, as I have argued above, the Proposed Guidelines purchase protection from
malpractice exposure at the price of forcing the patient to run a gauntlet of tests
that will have the practical effect of placing on him or her a heavy burden of
proving competence. In the end, videotaping of informed consent discussions,
despite the incursion it involves on the patient's privacy, seems to me to place less
of a burden on the patient's freedom.
In any event, whatever the role to be played in the process by videotaping,
immediate steps need to be taken to promote case-based dialogue among profes-
sionals who make determinations as to the incompetency of patients. To the extent
that courts continue to fail to draw helpful criteria out of the incompetency cases
that come before them, physicians and mental health professionals need to begin
to share with each other the critical facts of instructive cases that they have
decided and explain to each other why those cases were decided as they were. The
reports of such cases should be drawn on as precedents for decisionmaking in later
similar cases, and the decisionmakers who draw on such precedents should then
share with others how they have used the precedents. If they have extended the
precedents to apply to new facts, they should explain how the guidelines for
decisionmaking that the earlier cases seemed to stand for have been broadened
and why. If they have refused to apply the earlier precedents to the facts of the
case before them, they should explain how the guidelines for decisionmaking of
the earlier cases have been restricted and why. Out of this process should emerge
increasingly precise guidelines that respond to all and only problems that arise in
the real world of the doctor-patient relationship and that are constantly "fined and
refined" on the basis of actual experience in order to better handle those problems.
14James L. Werth, G. Andrew H. Benjamin, and Tony Farrenkopf, Requests for Physician-
Assisted Death: Guidelines for Assessing Mental Capacity and Impaired Judgment, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB.
POL'Y & LAW, 348-372 (2000).
15supra note 14.
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In closing, my fellow commentators all make interesting and challenging
points.
I share the concerns of Professors Burt, Martyn, and Bourguignon. And yet
those concerns do not lead me to share their conclusion that it is pointless or
unacceptably dangerous to establish institutions for determining whether patients
lack capacity to make medical decisions. As Professors Martyn and Bourguignon
point out, all of the dangers of the "Trojan Horse" that they fear in the area of
physician-assisted suicide are present when patients make requests to withhold or
withdraw life-prolonging treatment. Lane v. Candura, the case they offer as a
horrible example of physicians using their own values in determining whether
patients are competent, involved a woman who was refusing amputation of a
gangrenous leg. Yet neither Professors Martyn and Bourguignon nor Professor
Burt suggest that we should abolish the right of patients to refuse life-prolonging
treatment or abandon the effort to decide when a patient lacks capacity to exercise
that right for himself or herself.
On the one hand, we want to protect the right of patients to have their
expressed wishes followed as regards medical treatment. This is the fundamental
principle of patient autonomy. On the other hand, we want to make sure that such
expressed wishes have not been obtained by duress, misrepresentation of facts, or
by some other method that takes advantage of the patient. The balance that needs
to be worked out here cannot be achieved by a priori imposition of prophylactic
rules. It is not satisfactory to say that a patient's expressed wishes should be
followed under all circumstances. It is certainly not satisfactory to say that the
patient's expressed wishes should never be followed. Yet the latter is what
Professors Burt, Martyn, and Bourguignon seem to be suggesting with regard to
physician-assisted suicide.
As I argued earlier, what is needed in this field is solid research into what
determinations of capacity are being made, on the basis of what facts and by what
procedures. Since the early "right to die" cases of the 1970s, thousands of
physicians have acceded to the wishes of thousands of terminally ill patients who
have expressed preferences not to have their lives prolonged by medical means.
Have the physicians who dealt with these patients faced problems in determining
the mental capacity of these patients? If so, what are they and how were these
problems handled? Or are Martyn and Bourguignon correct in saying that phy-
sicians are making these decisions for patients on the basis of the physician's
values regarding life in general and the life of the particular patient by—among
other things—determining a patient to be mentally capable only when he or she
agrees with the physician? If Martyn and Bourguignon are correct, we are faced
with a much bigger problem than that posed by the "Trojan Horse" of the
Proposed Guidelines. How we handle the very few cases of physician-assisted
suicide that are likely to arise in a year's time is very small potatoes compared
with what may be going on already regarding the extraordinarily large number of
cases involving refusal of food and water, artificial ventilation, life-prolonging
medication, and so on.
In light of the special risk that Professors Burt, Martyn, and Bourguignon see
posed by determinations of mental capacity in the context of physician-assisted
suicide, it is ironic that the most reassuring data we have regarding such deter-
minations appear to come from information developed in that context. The report
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of the Oregon Health Division regarding the first year of experience under the
Oregon Death with Dignity Act evidences no influence of the prejudices that
Professors Burt, Martyn, and Bourguignon fear. None of the data suggest bias
against women, or minorities, or even those who could be characterized as having
an especially poor quality of life. Indeed, as many have noted, poor quality of life
was not the predominant reason for making and granting requests for physician-
assistance in suicide. Rather, the predominant reason was the strong desire of the
patient to exert control over the process of dying. Hopefully, Professors Burt,
Martyn, and Bourguignon take some comfort from the revelation of these facts.
And hopefully, they draw comfort as well from the detailed account recently
published in Lancet16 reporting on the first case of assisted suicide under the
Oregon Act. Much of Professors Martyn and Bourguignon's commentary is built
on what they admitted to be the "obscure and incomplete data of [news] reports"
that questioned the competency of the patient involved in that case. Unless one is
ready to suggest that Peter Reagan, the patient's physician, is lying in the account
that he published in Lancet, we now have facts that suggest that their worries on
that score can be set aside. Not only did the patient's original physician not
suggest that she lacked competence (the reason he gave for not prescribing the
medication was that he "didn't want to be involved" ), he sought out Dr. Reagan
after the patient's death to thank him for taking over her care.18 And, although the
second physician consulted did record in his notes that the patient was "probably
depressed," Dr. Reagan's description of the consulting psychiatrist's report on the
patient suggests that the second physician as well simply did not want to be
involved:
During a home visit lasting 90 minutes or so, [the psychiatrist] had painstakingly
evaluated Helen's competence and her mood, and concluded that she showed no
signs of depression. My own impression confirmed, I had to accept that this really
was going to happen. Of course, I could choose not to participate. The thought of
Helen dying so soon was almost too much to bear, and only slightly less difficult
was the knowledge that many very reasonable people would consider aiding in her
death a crime. On the other hand, I found even worse the thought of disappointing
this family. If I backed out, they'd feel about me the way they had about their
previous doctor, that I had strung them along, and in a way, insulted them.19
Consistent with the facts contained in the Oregon Health Department's report
and Dr. Reagan's Lancet article, I have long believed that we have less to fear
from legalized physician-assisted suicide than we do from current practices
regarding withholding and withdrawing treatment. Among other things, I think
that patients, physicians, and family members are likely to take much more
seriously decisions to assist suicide than decisions to "just let nature take its
course." But this is just conjecture on my part, and it is time for all of us to move
on from mere conjecture to fact finding and the development of protocols and
regulations based on facts. We need for this purpose to establish procedures by
16Peter Reagan, Helen, 353 Lancet 1265 (1999).
17Id. at 1265.
18Id. at 1267.
19Id. at 1266.
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means of which such protocols and regulations can be constantly refined in the
context of practice. In this process, scholarly comment certainly has a role to play.
Professor Youngner, for example, in his commentary, makes some interesting
suggestions for improvement in the Oregon Act. The Oregon legislature recently
amended the Death with Dignity Act to respond to suggestions of commentators
and to problems that have arisen in practice. Among the amendments was one
removing the comma on which Professors Martyn and Bourguignon, among
others, had based a proposed limiting interpretation of the statute. The sort of
"feedback loop" that this represents should be encouraged, refined, and extended.
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